9-minute read
keywords: evolutionary biology, neurobiology, philosophy
Despite millennia of arguments, the question of whether we have free will or not remains unresolved. Last year October, two neurobiologists stepped into the fray, giving me the chance to dip my toes into the free-will debate. I just reviewed Robert Sapolsky’s Determined which presented a case against. Though successfully showing that we have less of it than we think, I remain unconvinced by his total rejection of free will. For the second half of this two-part review, I turn to Kevin J. Mitchell’s Free Agents which, also starting from neurobiology, presents a tightly argued and compelling case in favour.
Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will, written by Kevin J. Mitchell, published by Princeton University Press in October 2023 (hardback, 333 pages)
Mitchell is a professor of genetics and neuroscience who blogs at Wiring the Brain and has been featured in several popular magazines. In 2018, Princeton published his book Innate: How the Wiring of Our Brains Shapes Who We Are. Based partially on responses to that book, he now tackles the implications for free will. Free Agents might test the patience of some readers as Mitchell only confronts the question of free will head-on in the last chapter. However, the book-length argument building up to it is very worthwhile, so I entreat you to stick with it. He has two reasons for this detour. First, he considers humans “the absolute worst place to start” (p. 18) given the complexities of our cognition and neurobiology. Second, he does not want to start with preconceived notions of what sort of properties our will should have to be considered “free”. Instead, he asks how agency (the ability to make choices and take actions) evolved in the first place. As such, the first half of the book examines the history of life and the major transitions in evolution through the lens of neurobiology. This is followed by several chapters that further flesh out his argument and tackle metaphysical issues that supposedly negate free will.
Mitchell’s retelling of life’s history turns out to be a fascinating exercise with relevance far beyond the free will debate. In essence, he gives one possible answer to the question of what life is. Though I can only scratch the surface here, every chapter lobbed little intellectual firecrackers my way that went off in my head most satisfyingly. One example: single-celled organisms are insulated from the outside world and have to work constantly, through the process of metabolism, against entropy to maintain their internal organization. What this means is that “life is not a state, it is a process […] persisting through time” (p. 26). That in turn births value and meaning: things matter to organisms relative to the goal of survival. Another example: deciding how to act requires information, which single-celled organisms obtain through specialized sensors. However, they only need to sense that which can affect their survival, the rest is irrelevant. Thus, they “inhabit a selected slice of reality” (p. 54), immediately calling to mind Ed Yong’s definition of an animal’s Umwelt. Last firecracker: an animal learns from its past by reinforcing neuronal connections that resulted in choices with good outcomes. Memories and habits are thus not stored elsewhere and consulted separately, they are “baked right into the decision-making machinery itself” (p. 141). Funny but profound side note: people are sometimes asked what advice they would give their younger selves. In reality, the opposite happens: “our past selves are giving advice to our present self all the time” (p. 142).
“Mitchell’s retelling of life’s history turns out to be a fascinating exercise with relevance far beyond the free will debate.”
More intellectual firework comes with Mitchell’s attempt to naturalize agency, i.e. to explain it in biological terms. A particularly heady chapter 9 explores this in-depth and draws on his previous book Innate. Concepts such as purpose, value, and meaning sound vague and immaterial. Not so, Mitchell says, they are made out of, instantiated in, biological matter. So, out of the window goes dualism. The value of a signal, whether it attracts or repels, resides not in the signal but in the response, which depends on how the neurons in the brain are wired. “Those connections set the criteria for how each receiver will interpret and respond to the incoming information” (p. 212), dubbed criterial causation. But reducing the system to just its components also misses the point. That only tells you how an action happens, not why. A signal might trigger a behaviour, but “it is the particular configuration of the organism that causes that signal to cause that behavior” (p. 67). In other words, “meaning drives the mechanisms. Acting for a reason is what living systems are physically set up to do” (p. 281). Organisms are not passively driven by outside signals, they interpret them, they are “meeting the world halfway, as an active partner in a dance that lasts a lifetime” (p. 217). This is the kind of academic poetry that blows my mind.
The parts of the book I found a bit iffy were chapters 7 and 8 where Mitchell discusses his ideas about determinism. Rejecting both the incompatibilism of Sam Harris and the compatibilism of Daniel Dennett, he sees two reasons why the world is not fully deterministic. First, at the macro level of neural networks we find “general randomness and thermal fluctuations” (p. 189) that can generate useful random behaviours to e.g. break decision deadlocks or solve problems. Sapolsky will no doubt object that Mitchell confuses unpredictability and indeterminacy. Second, quantum mechanics. Oh dear. As I have written elsewhere, this is a terribly abused idea that few people other than physicists have any business of invoking. That said, here goes. The traditional view is that the world behaves indeterministically at the quantum level, but deterministically at the classical level. Mitchell references a fascinating but controversial 2021 paper that argues that “the quantum-to-classical transition does not reflect spatial scale at all but rather the flow of time” (p. 159). Wait, what? In effect, these physicists propose that the properties of particles are undefined in the future and get resolved into definitive values when particles interact. “What we call “the present” is that period of transition from a future that is indefinite […] to a past that can no longer be changed” (p. 159). Very interesting, though I will withhold judgment to see what other physicists think of this. The upshot of these two effects would be that the universe is not predetermined which “opens the door for higher-level features to have some causal influence” (p. 164). How? If I understand Mitchell correctly, he envisions a form of top-down causation whereby the way the brain is organized constrains the lower-level components and influences how the system behaves.
“Ultimately, [Mitchell] thinks the question of free will is a red herring and takes a pragmatic view. […] Rather than all-or-none, we have degrees of freedom.”
So, what does all of this have to do with free will? Mitchell admits that much of what he discusses highlights constraints to free will, while his picture of indeterminacy generates opportunities for random behaviour that, while having their use, are not free will (as Sapolsky also pointed out). Where Mitchell deviates from Sapolsky is in concluding that such (useful) constraints shape rather than determine your behaviour. However, he is not convinced the question itself even makes sense. He thinks Sapolsky’s demand for a causeless cause is “an unattainable standard […] that could only be met by supernatural means” (p. 16). Similarly, he argues that absolutist definitions make no sense when taken to their logical conclusion. Why? Because he considers memories, knowledge, motivation, goals, etc. prior causes too, causing you to prioritize one action over another. These traits characterize you. If you had to be free from those as well, you would stop being you. Ultimately, he thinks the question of free will is a red herring and takes a pragmatic view: “If free will is the capacity for conscious, rational control of our actions, then I am happy in saying we have it” (p. 282). Organisms have evolved to do things for reasons. We might not always be free to choose those reasons, but we do have the capacity to reflect on them and we do have a degree of self-control. Rather than all-or-none, we have degrees of freedom, and not all people are equal in that regard. We develop it as we grow up and can temporarily (through e.g. drugs or stress) or permanently (through e.g. mental illness) lose some of it. What free will is not, is a nebulous property: “It is an evolved biological function that depends on the proper functioning of a distributed set of neural resources” (p. 282).
Reiterating the caveat that I do not expect two books to settle this question, how do they compare and where do I stand on the matter of free will thus far? Ironically, both authors start from the same point, neurobiology, and show the same thing, behaviour is subject to prior constraints beyond our control. In my view, Sapolsky leaps from there to the incongruous conclusion that we have no free will at all, while Mitchell convincingly argues we do have some measure of control. It would explain why we and other animals evolved social behaviour such as punishment (a point Sapolsky had to concede). I agree with Mitchell that much of the debate is rather frustrating, with participants not agreeing on definitions, going round in circles, and ultimately getting bogged down in semantics. Free Agents is a tightly argued and compelling case in favour of free will. Mitchell proves himself an able wordsmith who crams profound ideas in short sentences that benefit from reading and unpacking slowly. In its 299 sometimes dense and heady pages, it meanders less than Determined does. What made this book a spectacular read for me are the thought-provoking answers Mitchell provides to the question of what life actually is.
P.S. As I finished Free Agents I found myself thinking: “I would love to see Sapolsky and Mitchell in conversation”. Well, lo and behold, Theodor Nenu hosted just such a debate back in November on his YouTube channel Philosophical Trials. A very warm and respectful exchange of views that is well worth watching if you have 73 minutes to spare. Mitchell has since followed up on this with a multi-part blog post that questions more thoroughly Sapolsky’s claims, sources, and logic (part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4).
Disclosure: The publisher provided a review copy of this book. The opinion expressed here is my own, however.
Other recommended books mentioned in this review:
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The Inquisitive Biologist 
I really don’t see how this is a tightly argued case in favor of free will based on your review. It seems that Mitchell indeed confuses determinism with causality. Even quantum effects are causal.
Based on what you write, he seems to offer no pathway how biological matter would be able to escape causal mechanisms. Without such a pathway, there is no freedom, but causal chains all the way down. The fact that some of these biological systems have agency or experience meaning is simply irrelevant, red herrings too, just like the fact that some animal species have developed social practices such as punishment is irrelevant.
Also, having “some measure of control” does not equate to freedom, as no-one determines how much impulse control their specific body in that specific environmental context one has. If Mitchell (rightly) says the debate suffers from semantics, circular arguments, etc, he’d better be ready the quantify “some” himself, and explain how having “some” control leads to breaking free of causal material chains.
What people often miss is that the notion of “free will” as Sapolsky or Harris see it, is an absolute. Sure, some people have better or worse control over their impulses or their situation, and have more or less choices in their possible actions (addiction, prisoners, poverty, wealth, etc.) than others, but that doesn’t make any of us “free” in the sense that we are not 100% determined by the causal material chains of our own body (that obviously always has a history) in our surroundings. If you want to counter their arguments, you have to use the same definition of “free will”, or otherwise one is just adding more semantic mist.
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Thanks for your thoughts on this one.
I think you will then probably conclude that Mitchell is adding more semantic mist in that he has a pragmatic outlook and thinks the absolutist definition requiring complete free will makes no sense.
In the book, he makes an, in my view, convincing argument that if the only allowed form of free will is to be completely free from prior causes, this would not satisfy anyone’s concept of free will. Why? Because he argues that your memories, knowledge, understanding of the world, motivation and goals are also prior causes that (usefully) restrict you and help you make choices. Without those you would have no reason to choose any one thing over another and would be behaving randomly.
Both he and Sapolsky agree that prior causes constrain behaviour but he argues they shape rather than determine behaviour. Between “yes, you have absolute free will” and “no, you have no free will whatsoever”, he argues for free will within boundaries. Having some measure of control means you have a degrees of freedom.
You might also want to have a look at his conversation with Sapolsky and his later responses following up on that conversation. They might do a better job of explaining it than I do.
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Yes, that makes sense indeed, thanks for elaborating a bit.
I agree, some people have more measures of a control than others, and you could call those more ‘free’ indeed. But I would hesitate to jump to claiming because of that fact free will exists. I hesitate because that latter notion is tied to moral responsibility for most people, and that’s a whole other matter than comparing degrees of freedom in between individuals. Nobody is control of their measures of control – i.c. if you don’t have sufficient control, that doesn’t make you ‘responsible’ in the moral sense, it just makes you a less adapt at certain things. I suspect the claim “free will doesn’t exist” for most (it is for me at least) is a moral claim first and foremost, a warning about holding people responsible when they are not, as everybody is trapped in their specific causal chain – and whether they have more or less measure of control doesn’t really matter morally. It obviously does matter practically: e.g. we only let people with certain nerve control skill sets fly a plane, or those with severe disabled control mechanisms (violent criminals, severe violent psychotic patients, etc.) should be kept away so they can do no harm, etc. etc.
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My impression of Sapolsky viewpoint is indeed that for him the matter is primarily about the moral implications of saying we have free will (and are thus deserving of blame and praise). He thinks we ought to trash the justice system, meritocracy etc.
Mitchell responds to this concern as well in the first of his four responses to Sapolsky’s book, saying we can (and in many places already do) take people’s natural endowments and social circumstances into account in moral and legal considerations. We can do so without committing to a complete denial of free will.
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Some people are ´better´ than others, true. I wouldn´t trash the justice system either, and indeed, sometimes we do take certain factors into account, even though the overall system is very meritocratic and moralistic in most cases. So there is still lots of work to be done to convince most of the existence and inescapability of causal chains
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Agreed, and that’s the point I appreciated about Sapolsky’s book: we have less of it than many like to think and we are influenced by many subconsious factors. This is where Mitchell and Sapolsky agree with each other.
It’s just that I don’t understand Sapolsky’s leap from there to his extreme position. The funny thing is that in multiple places in Determined admits that his “soft” goal, the one he would already be happy with, is to convince people we have less free will. He is almost apologetic about his own position and in the conversation with Mitchell he says that 95% of the time he cannot live by his own beliefs.
He is nothing if not honest about it and perhaps weirdly I found him very sympathetic because of it. I really ought to seek out his previous book Behave.
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I think you don´t understand the leap because he uses ´free´ in absolute terms. it´s a zero- one thing: it either exists or it doesn’t.
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I see, yes. I admit I’m not convinced I find that a useful approach. It narrows the possible answers down to two extremes, neither of which sound realistic. Does that position interpret “it exists” as “a limited amount is not no free will, thus it exists”, or as “the only acceptable form is absolute free will” which is meaningless. Sapolsky is trying to proof a negative and the evidence he marshals doesn’t add up to support full rejection, hence I think he leaps to his conclusion.
Questions I raised in my review of his book is with which camp the burden of proof lies and what our default assumption should be in the meantime, as long as we cannot resolve this question. Those are questions he does not consider.
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yes good points about proving a negative. As a materialist, I just see no escape from causality.
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Review of “Free agents: how evolution gave us free will” Mitchell 2023
This is a wonderful book that covers many difficult areas relating to the human brain using language that is understandable by ordinary mortals. The author covers a huge amount of useful background in leading up to the titular subject of free will, but almost all of it is required (with perhaps one exception of the discussion in chapter 10 on psychological personality traits). But I do have a number of criticisms:
1) There are very few references. There is a bibliography of suggested sources of more information for each chapter at the end of the book, but only a small number of these are specifically referenced with footnotes in the text. There were quite a few places where I would like to have known the source of the information the author was quoting, but there was no reference given.
2) There is no specific mention of different “levels of description” of functionality in the brain. The topic is discussed indirectly in a number of places, and the impression strongly given that the author believes that there are different levels at which the functioning of the brain can be described, but I found it frustrating that there was no specific delineation of levels.
3) Consciousness was glossed over rather rapidly. There are several places in the early parts of the book that say that the distinction between conscious and subconscious processes will be covered later, but when the section on consciousness is finally reached in chapter 11, all it says is that “We are configured so that most of our cognitive processes operate subconsciously, with only certain types of information bubbling up to consciousness on a need-to-know basis.”
I have created a new website that contains proposals that cover these last two issues – see hierarchicalbrain.com
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I’ve followed Harris’ arguments, and Jerry Coyne. Listening to Dennet’s (RIP) rebuttals, Dan just seemed to cloud things. Sean Carroll tries to stay above the fray by calling Free Will “emergent” – and saying that a discussion of atoms and forces is too low level, that the behavior emerges with the complexity of biology. He also points out that to say something is deterministic but can never be predicted allows for Free Will to hide in the ambiguity – and as we are able to predict he’ll agree with limiting his definition of Free Will.
Personally, I agree with the determinists – that the physics that underlay our selves provides no purchase for a ghost in the machine making the decision, but I don’t find much utility in that argument.
I think it get’s a little fuzzy when it’s said that “we” or “you” have free will. What is this “we” or “you” that is talked about? If “you” is simply your conscious self – then there are a TON of unconscious drivers for our decisions – effectively competing agents. I think it’s this situation, where a “I” thinks it’s in charge – making decisions – but it turns out these are mostly post-hoc rationalizations of an unconscious process. I think that’s how Sam and Bob S. gain traction – they can point to all of the situations where “choice” is influenced by unknown external/internal factors and say, see, the “you” can be made to dance by pulling invisible strings – we don’t have free will… and they’re right.
And their assertion that all of the agents eventually follow the rules of physics is also right. But this doesn’t really resolve much except stick the finger in the eye of our intuition that “we” are the masters of our fate.
I think the most constructive path is to discuss how each person’s subconscious informs their decision in complex and only faintly predictable ways, while the “you” feels that it’s making decisions. Explain that these agents are really driving our decisions – and then, as Sean does, call “free will” that unpredictable outcome of a person’s agents.
Interested to hear what others feel.
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